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Abstract. A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a device with
unique behaviour that is hard to clone hence providing a secure finger-
print. A variety of PUF structures and PUF-based applications have been
explored theoretically as well as being implemented in practical settings.
Recently, the inherent unclonability of quantum states has been exploited
to derive the quantum analogue of PUF as well as new proposals for the
implementation of PUF. We present the first comprehensive study of
quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs) with quantum crypto-
graphic tools. We formally define qPUFs, encapsulating all requirements
of classical PUFs as well as introducing a new testability feature inherent
to the quantum setting only. We use a quantum game-based framework
to define different levels of security for qPUFs: quantum unconditional
unforgeability, quantum existential unforgeability and quantum selective
unforgeability. We introduce a new quantum attack technique based on
the universal quantum emulator algorithm of Marvin and Lloyd to prove
no qPUF can provide quantum existential unforgeability. On the other
hand, we prove that a large family of qPUFs (called unitary PUFs) can
provide quantum selective unforgeability which is the desired level of
security for most PUF-based applications.
1 Introduction
Canetti and Fischlin’s result on the impossibility of achieving secure crypto-
graphic protocols without any setup assumptions [1] has motivated a rich line of
research investigating the advantages of making hardware assumptions in pro-
tocol design. The idea was first introduced by Katz in [2], and attracted the
attention of researchers and developers as it adopts physical assumptions and
eliminates the need to trust a designated party or to rely on computational
assumptions. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are one of the hardware
assumptions that have greatly impacted the field [3].
PUFs are hardware structures designed to utilize the random physical dis-
orders which appear in any physical device during the manufacturing process.
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Because of the uncontrollable nature of these random disorders, building a clone
of the device is considered impractical. The behaviour of a PUF is usually equiv-
alent to a set of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) which are extracted through
physically querying the PUF and measuring its responses. The PUF’s responses
depend on its physical features and are assumed to be unpredictable, i.e. even
the manufacturer of the PUF, with access to many CRPs, cannot predict the
response to a new challenge [4]. This property makes PUFs different from other
hardware tokens in the sense that the manufacturer of a hardware token is com-
pletely aware of the behaviour of the token they have built [5].
So far, the cryptographic literature has only considered what we will call
classical PUFs (or cPUFs) restricted to classical CRPs. Most cPUFs generate
only a finite, albeit possibly exponential, number of CRPs [6]. Also, most of
them are vulnerable against different attacks like side-channel [7,6] and machine-
learning [8,9,10,11] attacks. Thus, considering the importance of cPUFs as a
hardware security primitive in several real-world applications, on one hand,
[6,12,13,14,15,16,17]3 and the recent advances in quantum technology, on the
other hand, it is worth investigating whether quantum technologies could boost
the security of cPUFs or if they, on the contrary, threaten their security. In
the current work, we address the general and formal treatment of PUFs in a
quantum world for the first time by defining quantum PUFs (qPUFs) as simple
quantum circuits that can be challenged with quantum states and respond with
quantum states. We identify the requirements a qPUF needs to meet to provide
the main security property required for most of the qPUF-based applications,
that is unforgeability4. All prior similar works [18,19,20,21] (see related work
paragraph below) considered the special case of qPUFs where the encoding of
the responses is known and in fact, the responses are public information. They
analysed the security of qPUFs only against adversaries with limited capabilities
while the formal definition of secure qPUFs and analysing their security against
general adversaries in the standard models remain missing from the literature.
Our Contributions. In more details, the contributions of this work are as
follows.
Formal definition of Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions - We first define
qPUFs as quantum channels and formalize the standard requirements of ro-
bustness, uniqueness and collision-resistance for qPUFs. We are guided by the
classical counterparts to establish the requirements that qPUFs should satisfy
to enable their usage as a cryptographic primitive. As an initial study in this
field, we only consider quantum channels with domain and range of the same
3 Recently SAMSUNG announced that in their new processor Exynox 9820 they have
integrated SRAM based PUF to store and manage personal data in perfect isolation.
Also, a UK company, Quantum Base, has started to mass-produce its patented
optical quantum PUFs.
4 Unpredictability and unclonability are other equivalent terms for this notion used
often in the literature.
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dimension. We show that the collision-resistance requirement, which is one of
the requirements for cPUFS, imposes the underlying transformation of qPUFs
to be unitary. We refer to such class of quantum PUFs as unitary qPUFs or
UqPUFs. Furthermore, any realistic UqPUF has to be equipped with an effi-
cient test algorithm to check the equality between the reference and response
quantum states. To the best of our knowledge, there is no efficient test algorithm
for mixed quantum states, hence, we restrict our study to the UqPUFs that are
operating on pure quantum states.
Defining secure qPUFs - We use the game-based framework to define three
security notions for qPUFs: quantum unconditional unforgeability, quantum ex-
istential unforgeability and quantum selective unforgeability. Informally, these
notions correspond to the unpredictability feature of cPUFs. The “unforgeabil-
ity” term and definition of existential unforgeability has been captured in the
classical PUF literature [22] and adapted in the quantum setting. The adversar-
ial model considered for defining all the security notions captures the strongest
type of attack models where the adversary has access to the qPUF and can query
it with his chosen quantum states from the domain Hilbert space of the qPUF.
Quantum unconditional unforgeability implies the security of qPUFs against
an unbounded adversary with unlimited access to it. In two other notions of
security, the adversary is a Quantum Polynomial-Time (QPT) adversary with
limited access to the qPUF and limited computational and storage resources.
Quantum existential unforgeability implies no adversary can generate a valid
new challenge-response pair while quantum selective unforgeability implies no
adversary can guess the valid response to an unknown challenge state picked
uniformly at random from the domain Hilbert space of qPUF.
Analysis of the universal quantum emulator - We use the universal quantum
emulator algorithm introduced by Marvian and Lloyd [23] as an adversarial
algorithm for the first time. To this end, we provide a precise analysis of the
success probability of the algorithm in outputting the output of an unknown
unitary to a given unknown quantum state as input by having a subset of input-
output pairs of that unitary. We use this algorithm and our analysis to show the
vulnerability of UqPUFs in the existential setting.
Results. We establish several possibility and impossibility results by analysing
the security of UqPUFs using the above tools. Our results concretely delineate
the settings where UqPUFs can provide the basic security requirement and can
be used to analyse the security of UqPUF-based schemes in the standard security
models.
– No UqPUF provides Quantum Unconditional Unforgeability. The presented
attack is the correct analogue of the brute-force attack for cPUFs.
– No UqPUF provides Quantum Existential Unforgeability. As mentioned above,
we show how the universal quantum emulator algorithm which is a QPT al-
gorithm can break this security property of UqPUFs.
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– Any UqPUF provides Quantum Selective Unforgeability In other words, no
QPT adversary can, on average, generate the response of a UqPUF to ran-
dom challenges. We prove, for any QPT adversary, the target challenge with
high probability will lie in the orthogonal subspace. Since the adversary can
query the UqPUF only before getting the target challenge, he cannot adapt
the samples accordingly. It is important to mention this is the scenario that
many UqPUF-based applications correspond to. Hence our main positive
result provides the first formal treatment of a practical family of UqPUFs.
Other Related Works The concept of Physical Unclonable Functions was
first introduced by Pappu et al. [24] in 2001, devising the first implementation
of an Optical PUF. Optical PUFs were subsequently improved as to generating
an independent number of CRPs [25]. Several structures of Physical Unclonable
Functions were further introduced including Arbiter PUFs [26], Ring-Oscillator
based PUFs [27,28] and SRAM PUFs [29]. For a comprehensive overview of
existing PUF structures, we refer the reader to [30,31].
The QR-PUF-based identification protocol has been implemented in [32]. In
addition to the security analysis of this protocol against intercept-resend attack
in [18], its security has also been analysed against other special types of attacks
targeting extracting information from an unknown challenge state [33,34,35]. In
another work, Nikolopoulos and Diamanti exploited Continuous variable encod-
ing to implement another practical QR-PUF based identification protocol [20].
The security of this protocol has also been analysed only against an attacker
who aims to efficiently estimate or clone an unknown challenge quantum state
[36,37]. Moreover, some other applications of QR-PUFs have been introduced in
[38] and [39].
In another independent recent work, Gianfelici et al. have presented a com-
mon theoretical framework for both cPUFs and QR-PUFs [40]. They quantita-
tively characterize the PUF properties, particularly robustness and unclonability.
They also introduce a generic PUF-based identification scheme and parameterize
its security based on the values obtained from the experimental implementation
of PUF.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical Physical Unclonable Functions
In this section, we briefly present the formal definition of Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) as found in the classical literature [22,4,5]. Let a D-family be a
set of physical devices generated through the same manufacturing process. Due
to unavoidable variations during manufacturing, each device has some unique
features that are not easily clonable. A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is
an operation making these features observable and measurable by the holder of
the device.
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As in [22,5], we formalize the manufacturing process of a PUF by defining
the Gen algorithm that takes the security parameter λ as input and generates a
PUF with an identifier id. Note that each time the Gen algorithm is run, a new
PUF with new id is built. So, we have:
PUFid ← Gen(λ). (1)
Also, we define the Eval algorithm that takes a challenge x and PUFid as inputs
and generates the corresponding response yid as output:
yid ← Eval(PUFid, x). (2)
Due to variations in the environmental conditions, for any given PUFid, the
Eval algorithm may generate a different response to the same challenge x. It is
required that this noise be bounded as follows; if Eval(PUFid, x) is run several
times, the maximum distance between the corresponding responses should at
most be δr. This requirement is termed the robustness requirement.
Consider a family of PUF generated by the same Gen algorithm, and as-
sume the algorithm Eval is run on all of them with a single challenge x. To be
able to distinguish each PUFid, it is required that the minimum distance be-
tween the corresponding responses be at least δu. This requirement is termed
the uniqueness requirement.
The other requirement considered in [22] is collision-resistance. This imposes
that whenever the Eval algorithm is run on PUFid with different challenges,
the minimum distance between the different responses must be at least δc. The
parameters δr, δu, δc are determined by the security parameter λ. Robustness,
uniqueness and collision-resistance are crucial for correctness of cryptographic
schemes built on top of PUFs. The conditions δr ≤ δu and δr ≤ δc must be
satisfied to allow for distinguishing different challenges and PUFs [22].
According to the above, a (λ, δr, δu, δc)-PUF is defined as a pair of algo-
rithms: Gen and Eval that provides the robustness, uniqueness and collision-
resistance requirements. We call a (λ, δr, δu, δc)-PUF a Classical PUF (cPUF), if
the Eval algorithm runs on classical information such as bit strings. For the sake
of comparison, in this paper we mainly consider the cPUFs that can be queried
via quantum states. Any classical function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, including a
cPUF’s Eval, can be modelled as a unitary transformation as follows
∀x ∈ {0, 1}n,∀y ∈ {0, 1}m : Uf |x, y〉 := |x, f(x)⊕ y〉
and thus a quantum adversary can query Uf on any desired quantum states such
as the superposition of all the classical inputs.
2.2 Quantum tools
We use the term quantum bit or qubit [41] to denote a simple two-level physical
system with quantum behaviour which is the quantum analogue to classical
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bits. Quantum states are denoted as unit vectors in a Hilbert space H. Any D-
dimensional Hilbert space is equipped with a set of D orthonormal vectors called
a basis. In the case of a single qubit where D=2, the following set of vectors are
a complete basis referred to as the computational bases:
|0〉 =
[
1
0
]
|1〉 =
[
0
1
]
and any qubit state can be written as |x〉 = α |0〉 + β |1〉 where |α|2 + |β|2 = 1
for some α, β ∈ C. The above form is called a superposition of two quantum
states. We say a quantum state is pure if it deterministically describes a vector
in the Hilbert space. On the other hand, a mixed quantum state is described as
a probability distribution over different pure quantum states:
ρ =
∑
s
ps|ψs〉〈ψs|
represented as a density matrix. If a quantum state can be written as the tensor
product of all its subsystems, we say that the state is separable, eg.
|ψAB〉 = |ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉
otherwise, it is referred to as the entangled state.
Expectation value or classical information of a quantum system is obtained by
measurements. A measurement operator is defined as a family of linear operators
{Mj} acting on the state where the index j refers to each measurement outcome.
If |x〉 is the quantum state before the measurement, then the probability of
obtaining result j is:
Pr(j) = 〈x|M†jMj |x〉 .
Transformations between pure quantum states are usually described by uni-
tary operators which are reversible and preserve the inner product. General
quantum transformations are Completely Positive Trace Preserving (CPTP or
CPT) maps which include also unitary matrices. If a CPT map does not preserve
the trace, we call it a Completely Positive (CP) map.
An important difference between quantum and classical bits is the impossi-
bility of creating perfect copies of general unknown quantum states, known as
the no-cloning theorem. This is an important limitation imposed by quantum
mechanics which is particularly relevant for cryptography. A variation of the
same feature states that it is impossible to obtain the exact classical description
of quantum states by having a single copy of it. Therefore, there exists a bound
on how well one can derive the classical description of quantum states depending
on their dimension and the number of available copies. Hence, distinguishing be-
tween unknown quantum states can be achieved only probabilistically. A useful
and relevant notion of quantum distance that we exploit in this paper is fidelity.
The fidelity of two pure quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 is defined as
F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) = | 〈ψ|φ〉|2.
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Generally, the fidelity of mixed states ρ and σ is defined by the Uhlmann fidelity:
F (ρ, σ) = [Tr(
√√
ρσ
√
ρ)]2.
Exploiting this quantum distance we define the notions of distinguishability and
indistinguishability of two quantum states.
Definition 1 (µ-distinguishability and ν-indistinguishability). Let F (·, ·)
denote the fidelity distance, and µ and ν the distinguishability and indistin-
guishability threshold parameters respectively such that 0 ≤ µ, ν ≤ 1. We say
two quantum states ρ and σ are µ-distinguishable if 0 ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1 − µ and
ν-indistinguishable if ν ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1.
Note that two quantum states, ρ and σ, are completely distinguishable or 1-
distinguishable (µ = 1), if F (ρ, σ) = 0 and they are completely indistinguishable
or 1-indistinguishable (ν = 1) if F (ρ, σ) = 1.
Due to the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing between all quantum
states according to the above definition, checking equality of two completely un-
known states is a non-trivial task. This is one of the major differences between
classical bits and qubits. Nevertheless, a probabilistic comparison of unknown
quantum states can be achieved through the simple quantum SWAP test algo-
rithm [42], and its generalisation to multiple copies introduced recently in [43].
Here we abstract from specific tests and define necessary conditions for a general
quantum test.
Definition 2 (Quantum Testing Algorithm). Let ρ⊗κ1 and σ⊗κ2 be κ1 and
κ2 copies of two quantum states ρ and σ, respectively. A Quantum Testing algo-
rithm T is a quantum algorithm that takes as input the tuple (ρ⊗κ1 ,σ⊗κ2) and
accepts ρ and σ as equal (outputs 1) with the following probability
Pr[1← T (ρ⊗κ1 , σ⊗κ2)] = 1− Pr[0← T (ρ⊗κ1 , σ⊗κ2)] = f(κ1, κ2, F (ρ, σ))
where F (ρ, σ) is the fidelity of the two states and f(κ1, κ2, F (ρ, σ)) satisfies the
following limits:
limF (ρ,σ)→1 f(κ1, κ2, F (ρ, σ)) = 1 ∀ (κ1, κ2)
limκ1,κ2→∞ f(κ1, κ2, F (ρ, σ)) = F (ρ, σ)
limF (ρ,σ)→0 f(κ1, κ2, F (ρ, σ)) = Err(κ1, κ2)
with Err(κ1, κ2) characterising the error of the test algorithm.
We will use the Diamond Norm as the the most common distance measure
for quantum operators QE and QF . It is defined in terms of l1 trace norm as
follows:
‖ QE −QF ‖≡ maxρ(‖ (QE ⊗ I)[ρ]− (QF ⊗ I)[ρ]) ‖1 .
Finally, we will let λ denote the security parameter. A non-negative function
(λ) is negligible if, for any constant c, (λ) ≤ 1λc for all sufficiently large λ.
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3 Quantum Emulation Algorithm
In this section, we describe the Quantum Emulation (QE) algorithm presented
in [23] as a quantum process learning tool that can outperform the existing ap-
proaches based on quantum tomography [44]. The main idea behind quantum
emulation comes from the question on the possibility of emulating the action
of an unknown unitary transformation on an unknown input quantum state by
having some of the input-output samples of the unitary. An emulator is not try-
ing to completely recreate the transformation or simulate the same dynamics.
Instead, it outputs the action of the transformation on a quantum state. The
original algorithm was developed and proposed in the context of quantum pro-
cess tomography, thus the analysis did not consider any adversarial behaviour.
For our cryptanalysis purposes, we need to provide a new fidelity analysis for
challenges not fully lying within the subspace of the learning phase. We further
optimise the success probability of our attack by optimising the choice of the
reference state.
3.1 The Circuit and Description
The circuit of the quantum emulation algorithm is depicted in Figure 1 also in
[23] and works as follows: Let U be a unitary transformation on a D-dimensional
Hilbert space HD, Sin = {|φi〉 ; i = 1, ...,K} be a sample of input states and
Sout = {|φouti 〉 ; i = 1, ...,K} the set of corresponding outputs, i.e |φouti 〉 = U |φi〉.
Also, let d be the dimension of the Hilbert space Hd spanned by Sin and |ψ〉, a
challenge state. The goal of the algorithm is to find the output of U on |ψ〉, that
is U |ψ〉.
The main building blocks of the algorithm are controlled-reflection gates
described as:
Rc(φ) = |0〉 〈0| ⊗ I+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ eipi|φ〉〈φ| (3)
A controlled-reflection gate acts as the identity (I) if the control qubit is |0〉, and
as R(φ) = eipi|φ〉〈φ| = I− 2 |φ〉 〈φ| if the control qubit is |1〉. The circuit also uses
Hadamard and SWAP gates and consists of four stages.
Stage 1. K number of sample states and a specific number of ancillary qubits
are chosen and used through the algorithm. We assume the algorithm uses all
of the states in Sin. The ancillary systems are all qubits prepared at |−〉. Let
|φr〉 ∈ Sin be considered as the reference state. This state can be chosen at
random or according to a special distribution. The first step consists of K − 1
blocks wherein each block, the following gates run on the state of the system
and an ancilla:
W (i) = Rc(|φi〉)HRc(|φr〉). (4)
According to equation (4), a controlled-reflection around the reference state |φr〉
is performed on |ψ〉 with the control qubit being on the |−〉 ancillary state. Then
a Hadamard gate runs on the ancilla followed by another controlled-reflection
around the sample state |φi〉. This is repeated for each of the K states in Sin
such that the input state is being entangled with the ancillas and also it is being
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Fig. 1: The circuit of the quantum emulation algorithm. |φr〉 is the reference
state and |φoutr 〉 is the output of the reference state. R(∗) gates are controlled-
reflection gates. In each block of Step 1, a reflection around the reference and
another sample state is being performed.
projected into the subspace Hd in a way that the information of |ψ〉 is encoded
in the coefficients of the general entangled state. This information is the overlap
of |ψ〉 with all the sample inputs. By reflecting around the reference state in each
block, the main state is pushed to |φr〉 and the probability of finding the system
at the reference state increases. The overall state of the circuit after Stage 1 is:
[W (K)...W (1)] |ψ〉 |−〉⊗K ≈ |φr〉 |Ω(anc)〉 (5)
where |Ω(anc)〉 is the entangled state of K ancillary qubits. The approximation
comes from the fact that the state is not only projected on the reference quan-
tum state but it is also projected on other sample quantum states with some
probability. We present a more precise formula in the next subsection.
Stage 2. In this stage, first a reflection around |φr〉 is performed and after ap-
plying a Hadamard gate on an extra ancilla, that ancilla is measured in the
computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. Based on the output of the measurement, one
can decide whether the first step was successful (i.e. the output of the measure-
ment is 0) or not. If the first step is successful, the main state has been pushed
to the reference state. In this case, the algorithm proceeds with Stage 3. If the
output is 1, the projection was unsuccessful and the input state remains almost
unchanged. In this case, either the algorithm aborts or it goes back to the first
stage and picks a new state as the reference. This stage has a post-selection role
which can be skipped to output a mixed state of two possible outputs.
Stage 3. The main state is swapped with |φoutr 〉 = U |φr〉 that is the output of
the reference state. This is done by means of a SWAP gate. At this point, the
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overall state of the system is:
(SWAP⊗ I⊗K) |φoutr 〉 |φr〉 |Ω(anc)〉 = |φr〉 |φoutr 〉 |Ω(anc)〉 . (6)
By tracing out the first qubit, the state of the system becomes |φoutr 〉 |Ω(anc)〉.
Stage 4. The last stage is very similar to the first one except that all blocks
are run in reverse order and the reflection gates are made from corresponding
output quantum states. The action of stage 4 is equivalent to:
W out(i) = Rc(|φouti 〉)HRc(|φoutr 〉) = (U⊗ I)W (i)(U† ⊗ I). (7)
After repeating this gate for all the output samples, U is acted on the projected
components of |ψ〉 and by restoring back the information of |ψ〉 from the ancilla,
the input state approaches U |ψ〉. The overall output state of the circuit at the
end of this stage is:
[W out(1)...W out(K)] |φoutr 〉 |Ω(anc)〉 ≈ U |ψ〉 |−〉⊗K (8)
where equality is obtained whenever the success probability of Stage 2 is equal
to 1.
3.2 Output fidelity analysis
We are interested in the fidelity of the output state |ψQE〉 of the algorithm and
the intended output U |ψ〉 to estimate the success. In the original paper, the
fidelity analysis is first provided for ideal controlled-reflection gates and later
a protocol is presented to implement them efficiently. In this paper, as we are
more interested in the theoretical bounds for the fidelity, all the gates including
the controlled-reflection gates are assumed to be ideal keeping in mind that the
implementation is possible [23,45]. We recall the main theorem of [23]:
Theorem 1. [23] Let EU be the quantum channel that describes the overall
effect of the algorithm presented above. Then for any input state ρ, the Uhlmann
fidelity of EU(ρ) and the desired state UρU† satisfies:
F (ρQE ,UρU
†) ≥ F (EU(ρ),UρU†) ≥
√
Psucc−stage1 (9)
where ρQE = |ψQE〉 〈ψQE | is the main output state(tracing out the ancillas)
when the post-selection in Stage 2 has been performed. EU(ρ) is the output of the
whole circuit without the post-selection measurement in Stage 2 and Psucc−stage1
is the success probability of Stage 1.
For the purpose of this paper, we need a more precise and concrete expression
for the output fidelity not covered in [23]. From the proof of Theorem 1 in [23],
it can be seen that the success probability of Stage 1 is calculated as follows:
Psucc−stage1 = | 〈φr|Tranc(|χf 〉 〈χf |) |φr〉 |2 (10)
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where |χf 〉 is the final state of the circuit after Stage 1 and Tranc(·) computes the
reduced density matrix by tracing out the ancillas. The overlap of the resulting
state and the reference state equals the success probability of Stage 1. Now
relying on Theorem 1, we only use equation (10) for our analysis henceforward.
The fidelity of the output state of the circuit highly depends on the choice
of the reference state (equation (10)) such that it may increase or decrease the
success probability of the adversary in different security models as we will discuss
in the Section 4. We establish the following recursive relation for the state of the
circuit after the i-th block of Stage 1, in terms of the previous state:
|χi〉 = 1
2
[(I −R(φr)) |χi−1〉 |0〉+R(φi)(I+R(φr)) |χi−1〉 |1〉]. (11)
Now by using this relation, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let |χK〉 be the output state of K-th block of the circuit (Figure 1).
Let |ψ〉 be the input state of the circuit, |φr〉 the reference state and |φi〉 other
sample states. We have:
|χK〉 = 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |0〉⊗K + |ψ〉 |1〉⊗K − 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |1〉⊗K
+
K∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[fij2
lij | 〈φr|ψ〉|xij | 〈φi|ψ〉|yij | 〈φr|φi〉|zij ] |φr〉 |qanc(i, j)〉
+
K∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[gij2
l′ij | 〈φr|ψ〉|x′ij | 〈φi|ψ〉|y′ij | 〈φr|φi〉|z′ij ] |φi〉 |q′anc(i, j)〉
(12)
where lij, xij, yij, zij, l
′
ij, x
′
ij, y
′
ij and z
′
ij are integer values indicating the power
of the terms of the coefficient. Note that fij and gij can be 0, 1 or -1 and qanc(i, j)
and q′anc(i, j) output a computational basis of K qubits (other than |0〉⊗K).
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction. For the first block (K = 1), according
to equation (11) and letting |χ0〉 = |ψ〉 we have:
|χ1〉 = 1
2
[(I −R(φr)) |ψ〉 |0〉+R(φi)(I+R(φr)) |ψ〉 |1〉]
where the term I − R(φr) = 2 |φr〉 〈φr| projects the previous state to |φr〉 with
the coefficient 〈φr|ψ〉 and the term R(φi)(I +R(φr)) is equal to:
R(φi)(I +R(φr)) = 2[I − |φr〉 〈φr| − 2 |φi〉 〈φi|+ 2 〈φi|φr〉 |φi〉 〈φr|].
Thus, the final relation between all the parameters in the first block is as follows.
|χ1〉 = 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |0〉+ |ψ〉 |1〉 − 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |1〉 − 2 〈φ1|ψ〉 |φ1〉 |1〉
+ 2 〈φr|ψ〉 〈φr|φ1〉 |φ1〉 |1〉
As can be seen, it satisfies the form of equation (12) where the first sum is zero
and in the second sum g10 = −1, g11 = +1, l′10 = l′11 = 1, x′10 = z′10 = 0, y′10 = 1,
x′11 = z
′
11 = 1 and y
′
11 = 0.
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Now we write |χK〉 according to equation (11), assume |χK−1〉 is written in
form of equation (12) and show |χK〉 also satisfies this equation.
|χK〉 = 〈φr|χK−1〉 |φr〉 |0〉+ |χK−1〉 |1〉 − 〈φr|χK−1〉 |φr〉 |1〉 − 2 〈φK |χK−1〉 |φK〉 |1〉
+ 2 〈φr|χK−1〉 〈φr|φK〉 |φK〉 |1〉
By substituting |χK−1〉 with its equivalent based on equation (12), we calculate
each term in the above formula. Note that the coefficient in the third term is
the same as the first one with minus sign; and the ancillary state for the first
term is |0〉 while for the third term is |1〉. Thus, we only show the details of the
calculation for the first term:
〈φr|〉χK−1 |φr〉 |0〉 =
〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |0〉⊗K + 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |1〉⊗K−1 |0〉 − 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |1〉⊗K−1 |0〉+
+
K−1∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[fij2
lij | 〈φr|ψ〉|xij | 〈φi|ψ〉|yij | 〈φr|φi〉|zij ] |φr〉 |qanc(i, j)〉 |0〉
+
K−1∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[gij2
l′ij | 〈φr|ψ〉|x′ij | 〈φi|ψ〉|y′ij | 〈φr|φi〉|z′ij+1] |φi〉 |q′anc(i, j)〉 |0〉 .
The second term is calculated as follows:
|χK−1〉 |1〉 = 〈φr|ψ〉 |0〉⊗K−1 |1〉+ |ψ〉 |1〉⊗K − 〈φr|ψ〉 |φr〉 |1〉⊗K +
+
K−1∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[fij2
lij | 〈φr|ψ〉|xij | 〈φi|ψ〉|yij | 〈φr|φi〉|zij ] |φr〉 |qanc(i, j)〉 |1〉
+
K−1∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
[gij2
l′ij | 〈φr|ψ〉|x′ij | 〈φi|ψ〉|y′ij | 〈φr|φi〉|z′ij ] |φi〉 |q′anc(i, j)〉 |1〉 .
The forth term −2 〈φK |χK−1〉 |φK〉 |1〉 has the coefficient
−2 〈φK |χK−1〉
which produces the same sigma terms while only l′i,j , x
′
i,j , y
′
i,j and z
′
i,j are in-
creased by one. The fifth term 2 〈φr|χK−1〉 〈φr|φK〉 |φK〉 |1〉 has the coefficient
2 〈φr|χK−1〉 〈φr|φK〉 and similarly produces the same sigma terms where li,j ,
xi,j , yi,j and zi,j are increased by one (Note that the 〈φr|φK〉 is itself one of
the terms of the sigma). Finally by adding all these terms the equation (12) is
obtained and the proof is complete. uunionsq
Having a precise expression for |χf 〉 from Theorem 2, one can calculate
Psucc−step1 of equation (10) by tracing out all the ancillary systems from the
density matrix of |χf 〉 〈χf |. Also, now it is clear that if |ψ〉 is orthogonal to the
Hd, the only term remaining in equation (12) is |ψ〉 |1〉⊗K . So, the input state
remains unchanged after the first stage and Psucc−step1 = 0.
12
For states projected in the subspace spanned by Sin, the overall channel
describing the quantum emulation algorithm has always a fixed point inside the
subspace [23]. Hence, Stage 1 is successful with probability close to 1 by assuming
the gates to be ideal.
4 Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions
Let there be a set of quantum devices that have been created through the same
manufacturing process. These devices respond with a quantum state when chal-
lenged with a quantum state. Similar to Section 2.1, we formalize the manufac-
turing process of qPUFs by defining a QGen algorithm:
qPUFid ← QGen(λ)
where id is the identifier of qPUFid and λ the security parameter.
We also need to define the QEval algorithm mapping any input quantum
state ρin ∈ Hdin to an output quantum state ρout ∈ Hdout where Hdin and
Hdout are the domain and range Hilbert spaces of qPUFid, denoted as:
ρout ← QEval(qPUFid, ρin).
For now, we allow for the most general form of trace-preserving quantum
maps, i.e. CPT maps for QEval. So, we have:
ρout = Λid(ρin)
Apart from the common algorithms defined for classical PUFs, we require
qPUFs to include an efficient test algorithm T as defined in Definition 2 to
test the equality between two unknown quantum states. This test algorithm
has not been considered in classical PUFs because of the existence of trivial
deterministic test algorithms in ideal settings (i.e. fully robust classical PUFs)
to test the equality between two classical bit strings. Thus, we define a Quantum
Physical Unclonable Function as follows.
Definition 3 (Quantum Physical Unclonable Function). Let λ be the se-
curity parameter, and δr, δu, δc ∈ [0, 1] the robustness, uniqueness and colli-
sion resistance thresholds. A (λ, δr, δu, δc)-qPUF includes the algorithms: QGen,
QEval and T satisfying Requirements 1, 2, and 3 defined below:
Requirement 1 (δr-Robustness) For any qPUFid generated through QGen(λ)
and evaluated using QEval on any two input states ρin and σin that are δr-
indistinguishable, the corresponding output quantum states ρout and σout are
also δr-indistinguishable with overwhelming probability,
Pr[δr ≤ F (ρout, σout) ≤ 1] = 1− negl(λ).
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Requirement 2 (δu-Uniqueness) For any two qPUFs generated by the QGen
algorithm, i.e. qPUFidi and qPUFidj , the corresponding CPT map models, i.e.
Λidi and Λidj are δu-distinguishable with overwhelming probability,
Pr[ ‖ (Λidi − Λidj )i 6=j ‖≥ δu ] = 1− negl(λ).
Requirement 3 (δc-Collision-Resistance) For any qPUFid generated by
QGen(λ) and evaluated by QEval on any two input states ρin and σin that are
δc-distinguishable, the corresponding output states ρout and σout are also δc-
distinguishable with overwhelming probability,
Pr[0 ≤ F (ρout, σout) ≤ 1− δc] = 1− negl(λ).
In qPUF-based applications such as device authentication (or identification),
it is necessary that there be a clear distinction between different qPUF instances
generated by the same QGen algorithm running on the same parameters λ [22].
To this end, the following conditions should be satisfied: δc ≤ 1 − δr and δu ≤
1− δr. So, we can drop δu and δc from the notation and characterize the qPUF
as (λ, δr)− qPUF.
We have initially allowed for any CPT map as QEval algorithm. Now, we let
the QEval algorithm be a CPT map with the same dimension of domain and
range Hilbert space, i.e. din = dout. We show that under this assumption, only
unitary transformations can simultaneously provide the collision-resistance and
robustness requirements of qPUFs.
Theorem 3. Non-unitary completely positive and trace-preserving (CPT) maps
with the same dimension of domain and range Hilbert space are not (λ, δr, δu, δc)-
qPUFs for any λ, δr, and δc.
Proof. The contractive property of trace-preserving operations [41] states that
for two general density operators ρ and σ we have:
Dtr(E(ρ), E(σ)) ≤ Dtr(ρ, σ)
where E denotes a CPT map. Similarly, because of the relation between trace
distance and the fidelity we have
F (E(ρ), E(σ)) ≥ F (ρ, σ)
Equality holds only when E is a unitary operation. Thus, no non-unitary oper-
ation satisfies requirement 3. uunionsq
Thus, in the rest of the paper, we restrict ourselves to unitary maps as QEval
algorithm and also focus on pure quantum states. We call this type of qPUFs,
Unitary qPUFs (or simply UqPUFs) and formally define them in Definition 5.
Although, we believe studying non-unitary qPUFs will be interesting future re-
search directions in this field. We require UqPUF transformations to be initially
unknown (or exponentially hard to recover) as defined in Definition 4. This is
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a hardware assumption which is also considered in classical PUFs mentioning
the PUF behaviour is unknown even for the manufacturer [4]. This requirement
might be achieved by sampling a family of unitaries indistinguishable from the
Haar family of unitary transformations as we believe there are efficient ways to
do this sampling [46,47].
Definition 4 (Unknown Unitary Transformation). We say a family of
unitary transformations Uu, over a D-dimensional Hilbert space HD is called
Unknown Unitaries, if for all QPT adversaries A the probability of estimating
the output of Uu on any randomly picked state |ψ〉 ∈ HD is at most negligibly
higher than the probability of estimating the output of a Haar random unitary
operator on that state:
| Pr
U←Uu
[F (A(|ψ〉), U |ψ〉) ≥ non-negl(λ)]− Pr
Uµ←µ
[F (A(|ψ〉), Uµ |ψ〉)
≥ non-negl(λ)]| = negl(λ).
Defining the qPUF as an unknown unitary transformation has another advan-
tage as well. Two UqPUFs also satisfy a natural notion of unclonability, known
as no-cloning of unitary transformation [48] which states that two black-box
unitary transformations O1 and O2 cannot be perfectly cloned by a single-use
unless the trivial cases of perfect distinguishability or when O1 = O2. Thus,
two UqPUFs, as long as they correspond to different unitaries, which is satisfied
by the uniqueness requirement, are unclonable by quantum mechanics through
a single-use. In the following section, we then show how this minimum unclon-
ability property can be extended to the case where the transformation has been
used multiple times by formally introducing the notion of unforgeability. Thus,
we define the unitary qPUFs as follows.
Definition 5 (Unitary qPUF (UqPUF)). A Unitary qPUF ((λ, δr)−UqPUF)
is a (λ, δr) − qPUF that its QEval algorithm is modelled by an unknown uni-
tary transformation Uid over a D-dimensional Hilbert space, HD operating on
pure input quantum states |ψin〉 ∈ HD and returning pure output quantum states
|ψout〉 ∈ HD,
|ψout〉 = QEval(UqPUFid, |ψin〉) = Uid |ψin〉 .
As a result of the distance-preserving property of UqPUFs, we drop δr from
the notation and simply characterise UqPUF as λ-UqPUFs.
4.1 Security notion for qPUFs
The security of most PUF-based applications such as PUF-based identification
protocols relies on the unforgeability of PUFs [22]. Informally, unforgeability
means that given a subset of challenge-response pairs of the target PUF, the
probability of correctly guessing a new challenge-response pair shall be negligible
in terms of the security parameter. In this section, we formally define this security
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notion for qPUFs in a game-based framework which is a standard framework
for defining security of cryptographic primitives and analysing their security
[22,49,13].
Accordingly, we define unforgeability as a game between an adversary who
represents the malicious party and a challenger who plays the role of the honest
party. The game is run in four steps: Setup, Learning, Challenge and Guess.
In the setup phase, the necessary public and private parameters and functions
are shared between the adversary and the challenger.
The learning phase models the amount of knowledge that the adversary can
get from the challenger. Similar to [22], we consider chosen-input attacks mod-
elling an adversary that has access to the qPUF and can query it with his own
chosen inputs from the domain Hilbert space. Because of the quantum nature of
the adversary’s queries, the adversary has to prepare two copies of each query,
keep one in his database and send the other one to the challenger.
The challenge phase captures the intended security notion. We consider here
two types of challenge phase: Existential and Selective. In an existential challenge
phase, the adversary chooses the challenge state while in a selective one, the
challenge state is chosen by the challenger. We characterize a ”new” existential
challenge by imposing the adversary to choose a state that is µ-distinguishable
from all the inputs queries in the learning phase. In the selective case, to ensure
the adversary has no knowledge about the challenge, we impose the challenger
to choose the challenge uniformly at random from the domain Hilbert space.
Finally, in the guess phase, the adversary outputs his guess of the response
corresponding to the challenge chosen in the challenge phase. The challenger
checks the equality between the adversary’s guess and the correct response with
a test algorithm. The adversary wins the game if the output of the test algorithm
is 1.
Let qPUF = (QGen,QEval, T ) and T be defined as Definition 3 and 2,
respectively. We formalize the above description through the game GqPUFc,µ (A, λ)
running between an adversary A and a challenger C:
Setup. The challenger C runs QGen(λ) to build an instance of the qPUF
family, qPUFid. Then, C reveals to the adversary A, the domain and range
Hilbert space of qPUFid respectively denoted by Hin and Hout as well as
the identifier of qPUFid, id. The challenger initialises two empty databases,
Sin and Sout and shares them with the adversary A.
Learning. For i = 1 : k
• A prepares two copies of a quantum state ρi ∈ Hdin, appends one to Sin
and sends the other to C;
• C runs QEval(qPUFid, ρi) and sends ρouti , to A;
• A appends ρouti to Sout.
Challenge. c specifies the type of the challenge phase.
• If c = qEx: A picks a quantum state ρ∗ ∈ Hdin at least µ-distinguishable
from all the states in Sin and sends κ1 copies of it to C;
• If c = qSel: C chooses a quantum state ρ∗ at random from the uniform
distribution over the Hilbert space Hdin. The challenger keeps κ1 copies
of |ψ〉 and sends an extra copy of |ψ〉 to A.
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Guess.
• A sends κ2 copies of his guess ρ′ to C;
• C runs QEval(qPUFid, ρ∗⊗κ1), and gets ρ∗⊗κ1out ;
• C runs the test algorithm b ← T (ρ∗⊗κ1out , ρ′⊗κ2) where b ∈ {0, 1} and
outputs b. The adversary wins the game if b = 1.
Based on the above game, we define the security notions, quantum conditional
unforgeability, quantum existential unforgeability and quantum selective unforge-
ability for qPUFs; where the first one, models unforgeability of qPUFs against
unbounded adversaries with unlimited access to the qPUF in the learning phase;
the second one is the most common and strongest type of unforgeability against
Quantum Polynomial-Time (QPT) adversaries; finally the third one is a weaker
notion of unforgeability that is sufficient for most PUF-based applications like
PUF-based identification protocols.
Definition 6 (Quantum Unconditional Unforgeability). A qPUF pro-
vides quantum unconditional unforgeability if the success probability of any un-
bounded adversary A in winning the game GqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A) is negligible in λ
Pr[1← GqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = negl(λ)
Definition 7 (µ-Quantum Existential Unforgeability). A qPUF provides
µ-quantum existential unforgeability if the success probability of any Quantum
Polynomial-Time (QPT) adversary A in winning the game GqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A) is neg-
ligible in λ
Pr[1← GqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = negl(λ)
Definition 8 (Quantum Selective Unforgeability). A qPUF provides quan-
tum selective unforgeability if the success probability of any Quantum Polynomial-
Time (QPT) A in winning the game GqPUFqSel (λ,A) is negligible in λ
Pr[1← GqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = negl(λ)
4.2 Security analysis of Unitary qPUFs
Here, we show which security notions defined in Section 4.1 can be achieved by
unitary qPUFs (UqPUFs) over a D-dimensional Hilbert space operating on pure
quantum states.
In the classical setting, cPUFs can be fully described by the finite set of CRPs,
and this suffices for breaking unforgeability. More precisely, an unbounded ad-
versary can extract the entire set of CRPs by querying the target cPUF with all
possible challenges [6]. If the challenges are n-bit strings, the number of possible
challenges is 2n. However, in the quantum setting, a UqPUF can generate an
infinite number of quantum challenge-response pairs such that extracting all of
them is hard, even for unbounded adversaries. This, combined with limitations
imposed by quantum mechanics such as no-cloning [50] and the limits on state
estimation [51], raise the question if UqPUFs could satisfy unforgeability against
unbounded adversaries. We now prove that no UqPUF provides quantum un-
conditional unforgeability ad defined in Definition 6.
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Theorem 4 (No UqPUF provides quantum unconditional unforgeabil-
ity). For any λ-UqPUF and any 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, there exists an unbounded quantum
adversary A such that
Pr[1← GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = non-negl(λ)
Proof. The key idea of the proof is based on complexity analysis of unitary
tomography and implementation of a general unitary by single and double qubit
gates, since for an unbounded quantum adversary, it will be feasible to extract the
unitary matrix by tomography and then build the extracted unitary by general
gate decomposition method. By using the Solovay-Kitaev theorem [41], we then
show that the adversary can build the unitary matrix of the UqPUF performing
on n-qubits, within an arbitrarily small distance  usingO(n24n logc(n24n)) gates
and hence win the game with any test algorithm T . Let UqPUFid operate on
n-qubit input-output pairs where n = log(D). In the learning phase, A selects
a complete set of orthonormal basis of HD denoted as {|bi〉}2ni=1 and queries
UqPUFid with each base 2
n times. So, the total number of queries in the learning
phase is k1 = 2
2n.
Then, A runs a unitary tomography algorithm to extract the mathemat-
ical description of the unknown unitary transformation corresponding to the
UqPUFid, say Uid. It has been shown in [41] that the complexity of this algo-
rithm is O(22n) for n-qubit input-output pairs. This is feasible for an unbounded
adversary. It is clear that once the mathematical description of the unitary is
extracted, A can simply calculate the response of the unitary to a known chal-
lenge quantum state and wins the game GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A) for any value of µ. So, we
have:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = 1.
We can also show the unbounded adversary wins even the weaker notion of the
security, i.e. quantum selective unforgeability, where he has only one copy of the
challenge quantum state. To win the game with the selective challenge phase,
the adversary needs to implement the unitary.
It is known that any unitary transformation over H2n requires O(22n) two-
level unitary operations or O(n222n) single qubit and CNOT gates [41] to be
implemented. However, according to Solovay-Kitaev theorem [41], to implement
a unitary with an accuracy  using any circuit consisting of m single qubit and
CNOT gates, O(m logc(m/c)) gates from the discrete set are required where c is
a constant approximately equal to 2. Thus, an arbitrary unitary performing on
n-qubit can be approximately implemented within an arbitrarily small distance
 using O(n24n logc(n24n)) gates.
So, A implements the unitary U′id with error . Let A get the challenge
state |ψ〉 in the qSel Challenge phase. The adversary queries U′id with |ψ〉
and gets |ω〉 = U′id |ψ〉 as output. Since the  can be arbitrary small, then
F (Uid |ψ〉 ,U′id |ψ〉) ≥ 1− negl(λ). So, A’s output |ω〉 passes any test algorithm
T (|ψout〉⊗κ1 , |ω〉⊗κ2) with probability close to 1. Again, an unbounded adversary
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wins the game GUqPUFqSel,µ (λ,A) with probability 1:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = 1 uunionsq
Exploiting the quantum emulation algorithm introduced in Section 3 we now
turn to quantum existential unforgeability, and show that no UqPUF provides
quantum existential unforgeability for any µ 6= 1 as defined in Definition 7.
Note that the case µ = 1 corresponds to the existential challenge state being
orthogonal to all the queried states in the learning phase. With µ = 1, the
adversary is prevented from taking advantage of its quantum access to the qPUF
to win the game.
Theorem 5 (No UqPUF provides quantum existential unforgeability).
For any λ-UqPUF, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1− non-negl(λ), there exits a QPT adversary
A such that
Pr[1← GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = non-negl(λ).
Proof. We show there is a QPT adversary A who wins the game GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)
with non-negligible probability in λ. The adversary A runs the learning phase of
the game GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A) with |φ1〉 and |φ2〉 such that |φ1〉 can be any quantum
state in HD and
|φ2〉 =
{
1√
2
(|φ1〉+ |φ3〉) if 0 ≤ µ ≤ 12√
µ |φ1〉+
√
1− µ |φ3〉 if 12 ≤ µ ≤ 1− non-negl(λ)
Without loss of the generality, we assume A chooses one of the computational
basis of HD as |φ1〉. Then, A chooses an orthogonal state to |φ1〉 as |φ3〉 and sets
|φ2〉 the superposition of these two states. In the existential challenge phase, A
sets |φ3〉 as his chosen challenge. Note that |φ3〉 satisfies the µ-distinguishability
of the challenge state with both |φ1〉 and |φ2〉. In the guess phase, to estimate the
output of UqPUF to |φ3〉, the adversary A runs the quantum emulation (QE)
algorithm defined in Section 3 with the reference state |φr〉 = |φ2〉.
Relying on Theorem 2, the output state of Stage 1 of the QE algorithm is:
|χf 〉 = 〈φ2|φ3〉 |φ2〉 |0〉+ |φ3〉 |1〉 − 〈φ2|φ3〉 |φ2〉 |1〉
− 2 〈φ1|φ3〉 |φ1〉 |1〉+ 2 〈φ2|φ3〉 〈φ2|φ1〉 |φ1〉 |1〉 .
Note that 〈φ1|φ3〉 = 0 and we set 〈φ2|φ3〉 = α and 〈φ2|φ1〉 = β based on the
choice of |φ2〉, the above equation can be simplified as:
|χf 〉 = α |φ2〉 |0〉+ |φ3〉 |1〉 − α |φ2〉 |1〉+ 2αβ |φ1〉 |1〉 .
Now, according to Theorem 1, the final fidelity in terms of the success probability
of Stage 1 can be obtained by calculating the density matrix of |χf 〉 and tracing
out the ancillas:
Psucc−stage1 = | 〈φ2|Tranc(|χf 〉 〈χf |) |φ2〉 |2 = |α2(1 + 4α2β2)|2.
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We have different choices for the reference state depending on the distinguisha-
bility parameter µ. For cases where the adversary is allowed to produce a new
state with at least overlap half with all the states in the learning phase, by
choosing the uniform superposition of the states where α = β = 1√
2
, the output
fidelity will be:
F (|φout′3 〉 〈φout
′
3 | , |φout3 〉 〈φout3 |) ≥
√
Psucc−stage1 = 1.
where |φout′3 〉 and |φout3 〉 are the output of the QE algorithm and UqPUF to |φ3〉,
respectively.
As can be seen, these two states are completely indistinguishable So, the
success probability of A for any test according to Definition 2 is:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = Pr[1← T (|ψout〉
⊗κ1 , |ω〉⊗κ2)] = 1
which is the optimal choice of the reference. On the other hand, for the cases
where the adversary is restricted to produce a challenge more than half dis-
tinguishable, we can still create a superposed state with α =
√
1− µ and
β =
√
µ and end up with the following fidelity of the emulation by setting
µ = 1− non-negl(λ)
F (|φout′3 〉 〈φout
′
3 | , |φout3 〉 〈φout3 |) ≥ |α2(1 + 4α2β2)|
= |(1− µ)(1 + 4µ(1− µ))|
= non-negl(λ).
Recall that the security parameter λ includes the number of copies used in
the test algorithm (κ1, κ2), by increasing them the probability of accepting will
converge to the above fidelity thus for any 12 < µ ≤ 1− non-negl(λ):
Pr[1← GUqPUFqEx,µ (λ,A)] = Pr[1← T (|φout3 〉
⊗κ1 , |φout′3 〉
⊗κ2
)] = non-negl(λ)
uunionsq
This theorem implies that the adversary can always generate the correct re-
sponse to his chosen challenge provided that he can query it in superposition
with other quantum states during the learning phase in terms of the parameter
µ. Note that since output quantum states in the learning phase are unknown
to the adversary, the more straightforward strategy of superposing the learnt
output quantum states cannot be efficiently performed. More precisely, the ad-
versary cannot prepare the precise target superposition of the output states
that are completely unknown [52,53]. Hence the proposed attack is general but
non-trivial.
We now further relax the level of security and consider quantum selective
unforgeability. We show that any UqPUF can provide this weaker notion of
security. Note that in most of the PUF-based applications such as PUF-based
identification protocols, selective unforgeability is sufficient.
20
We need the following lemma to prove the quantum selective unforgeability
feature of UqPUFs. The lemma implies the average probability of any state in
HD to be projected in a subspace Hd where d ≤ D. Based on this lemma, we
calculate the probability of a state chosen uniformly at random from HD to
be projected in the orthogonal subspace of the adversary’s database where the
quantum emulation or similar attacks does not work.
Lemma 1. Let HD be a D-dimensional Hilbert space and Hd a subspace of HD
with dimension d. Also, let Πd be any operator projecting any quantum state in
HD into Hd. The average probability that any state, chosen uniformly at random
from HD, |ψ〉 ∈
R
HD to be projected into Hd is equal to dD
Pr
|ψ〉,Πd
[| 〈ψ|Πd |ψ〉 |] = d
D
Proof. The proof is mainly based on the symmetry of the Hilbert space and
the fact that the probability of falling into each subspace is equal for any state
uniformly picked at random.
Note that Any state |ψ〉 ∈ HD can be written in terms of the orthonormal
bases of HD denoted by |bi〉, as follows:
|ψ〉 =
D−1∑
i=0
αi |bi〉 with
D−1∑
i=0
|αi|2 = 1
where αi are complex coefficients. A projection into a smaller subspace consists of
choosing d bases of HD in the form of ∑d−1j=0 |bj〉 〈bj |. Without loss of generality,
we can assume D = md where m is an integer. This assumption is always correct
for qubit spaces. This means that the larger Hilbert space can be divided into
m smaller subspaces each with dimension d. Let {|ei〉}d−1i=0 be a subset of HD
which makes a complete set of bases for one of the d-dimensional subspaces.
A projector projects |ψ〉 into one of the subspaces. As |ψ〉 has been picked at
random and the subspaces are symmetric, the probability of falling into each
subspace is the same and equal to 1m which is
d
D . Otherwise either the sum of all
probabilities would not be 1 or the |ψ〉 has not been picked uniformly at random
from HD. This shows that on average the probability of projecting a state ψ is
d
D . This can also be seen by the fact that the sum of all projectors in a complete
set of projectors is equal to one. In this case, we have
D−1∑
i=0
Πi = I
By sandwiching |ψ〉 on both sides we have:
D−1∑
i=0
〈ψ|Πi |ψ〉 = 1.
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Each 〈ψ|Πi |ψ〉 is itself equal to
∑d−1
j=0 | 〈ψ| dij〉|2 where |dij〉s are the bases as-
sociated to the subspace that the projector Πi projects into. This corresponds
to all the permutations of d number of the coefficient |αi|2 which will be 1d on
average. Thus we have:
D−1∑
i=0
PrΠi
d
= 1→ PrΠ = d
D
uunionsq
To establish our possibility result, we first present a preliminary theorem
which demonstrates the security of the UqPUF considering an ideal test algo-
rithm which asymptotically satisfies the notion of distance. We formalize the
ideal test T idealδ as follows:
Definition 9 (T idealδ Test Algorithm). We call a test algorithm according to
Definition 2, a T idealδ Test Algorithm when for any two state |ψ〉 and |φ〉 with
fidelity F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) the test responds as follows:
T idealδ =
{
1 F (|ψ〉 , |φ〉) ≥ δ
0 otherwise
Theorem 6. For any UqPUF = (QGen,QEval, T idealδ ), and any non-zero δ,
the success probability of any QPT adversary A in the game GUqPUFqSel (λ,A) is
bounded as follows:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] ≤
d+ 1
D
where D is the dimension of the Hilbert space that the challenge quantum state
is picked from, and 0 ≤ d ≤ D − 1 is the dimension of the largest subspace of
HD that the adversary can span in the learning phase of GUqPUFqSel (λ,A).
Proof. The complete proof can be found in Appendix A, here we only sketch the
main idea. We are interested in the average success probability of the adversary
running the game GUqPUFqSel (λ,A). Let the subspace spanned by the learnt queries
be a d-dimensional subspace of HD denoted by Hd. We calculate the average
fidelity of the adversary’s estimated output state |ω〉 and the correct output
|ψout〉, over all choices of the qSel challenge state |ψ〉. We require this fidelity to
be greater than a value δ imposed by the T idealδ :
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = Pr|ψ〉∈HD[F (|ω〉 , |ψ
out〉) ≥ δ].
Note that because of the quantum nature of queries in the learning phase
and the limited number of queries that the QPT adversary A can make, A might
not have the classical description of the responses to his queries. So, we let A′
be another QPT adversary who has full knowledge of Hd. It is obvious that the
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success probability of A′ would be higher than the success probability of A due
to the extra knowledge that A′ has. So, we have
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] ≤ Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)]
In rest of the proof, We calculate the success probability of A′ which is the
higher bound for the success probability of A. We write this probability in terms
of its partial probabilities for the states orthogonal to Hd and the rest of the
space:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)] = Pr|ψ〉∈Hd⊥ [F ≥ δ]Pr[|ψ〉 ∈ H
d⊥ ]
+ Pr
|ψ〉6∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ]Pr[|ψ〉 6∈ Hd⊥ ].
The probability of projection into the orthogonal subspace and the conjugate
subspace can be obtained by calling Lemma 1:
Pr[|ψ〉 ∈ Hd⊥ ] = d
⊥
D
where d⊥ = D − d; And
Pr[|ψ〉 6∈ Hd⊥ ] = 1− Pr[|ψ〉 ∈ Hd⊥ ] = d
D
We also assume there exists a QPT algorithm that its average probability
over all the states not in the orthogonal subspace to estimate their outputs with
F ≥ δ is 1, i.e. Pr
|ψ〉6∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ] = 1.
Thus, the only remaining term to calculate is the probability that the average
fidelity be greater than δ in the orthogonal subspace, i.e. Pr
|ψ〉∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ]. We
show in Appendix A that since the qSel challenge is chosen uniformly at random
from HD, the best attack strategy to achieve the desired fidelity is choosing the
output state uniformly at random from HD.
Then, we calculate the average fidelity according to Haar measure and show
the average probability for non-zero fidelity is bounded by:
Pr
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
[F 6= 0] ≤ 1
D − d
So, for non-zero δ we also have,
Pr
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
[F ≥ δ] ≤ 1
D − d
As a result, the success probability of A is bounded by
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] ≤ Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)] ≤
d+ 1
D
And the theorem is proved. uunionsq
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Theorem 7 (Any UqPUF provides quantum selective unforgeability).
Let the test algorithm T be defined according to Definition 2 and satisfy the con-
dition Err(κ1, κ2) = negl(κ1, κ2). Then, for any UqPUF = (QGen,QEval, T )
and any QPT adversary, we have:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = negl(λ).
Proof. Let |ψ〉 be quantum state chosen by the challenger in the selective chal-
lenge phase. Also, let |ψout〉 and |ω〉 be the output of the UqPUF and the ad-
versary A to |ψ〉, respectively. Note that the success probability of A in game
GUqPUFqSel (λ,A) is equal to the probability of the test algorithm in outputting 1:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = Pr[1← T (|ψout〉
⊗κ1 , |ω〉⊗κ2)]
For simplicity, we denote Pr[1← T (|ω〉⊗κ1 , |ψout〉⊗κ2)] with Pr[1← T ]. To
calculate this probability, we consider two independent cases where leads the T
outputs 1. We let δ be the threshold for F (|ω〉 , |ψout〉) that helps us to write
the Pr[1← T ] as sum of two terms, i.e. the probability of T outputting 1 while
F ≥ δ and the probability of T outputting 1 while F < δ:
Pr[1← T ] = Pr[1← T , F ≥ δ] + Pr[1← T , F < δ]
Let δ = negl(λ) hence we have
Pr[1← T ] = Pr[1← T |F ≥ negl(λ)]Pr[F ≥ negl(λ)]
+ Pr[1← T |F < negl(λ)]Pr[F < negl(λ)]
and then from Theorem 6, it can be concluded that
Pr[F ≥ negl(λ)] ≤ d+ 1
D
where d is the dimension of the subspace spanned by the learnt queries and D
is the dimension of the Hilbert space that the UqPUF is defined over it. Thus,
D = 2n where n is the number of qubits in each input/output state. Since the
adversary is a QPT adversary, the number of learnt queries and as a result the
value of d should be polynomial in n, i.e. d = poly(n).
Also, according to Definition 2, we have,
Pr[1← T |F < negl(λ)] = Err(κ1, κ2)
And,
Pr[1← T |F ≥ negl(λ)] ≤ F
Considering the equality cases and due to the fact that Pr[F < negl(λ)] =
1− Pr[F ≥ negl(λ)],
Pr[1← T ] = Err(κ1, κ2)(1− d+ 1
D
) + negl(λ)
d+ 1
D
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Recall that Err(κ1, κ2) = negl(κ1, κ2), d = poly(n) and D = 2
n and hence
d+1
D = negl(n) and the probability that the test algorithm outputs 1 is computed
as
Pr[1← T ] = negl(κ1, κ2)(1− negl(n)) + negl(λ)negl(n)
= negl(κ1, κ2) + negl(λ)negl(n)
Let λ = f(κ1, κ2, n), therefore we have
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = Pr[1← T ] = negl(λ)
and the proof is complete. uunionsq
5 Discussion: Comparison with other PUF instances
Here, we briefly discuss how requirements and security properties defined for
cPUFs and QR-PUFs [18,19] in the literature differ from or relate to what we
have defined as qPUF in this paper, while leaving a concrete comparison between
various PUF instances for future studies.
Quantum PUFs and Classical PUFs
Most of the available PUF structures use digital encoding as their inputs and
outputs so that they can easily be integrated with other functionalities in In-
tegrated Circuits (ICs). This means their input-output pairs are bit-strings. As
we can encode the bit strings in computational bases of the Hilbert space, the
cPUFs can be considered as special types of Unitary qPUFs (UqPUFs) that can
only map the computational bases in their input domain to other computational
bases in their output range. So, our result stating that no UqPUF provides quan-
tum existential unforgeability also shows no cPUF, assuming that they can be
queried by quantum states, can provide this security notion neither for µ 6= 1.
According to [22], if a cPUF provides the min-entropy requirement (which
imposes that the cPUF responses are linearly independent) then it can provide
existential unforgeability [22] against classical adversaries with no quantum ac-
cess to the cPUF. However, this requirement cannot be satisfied with most of
the common cPUF structures as shown in [8,9,10,11]. Instead of the min-entropy
requirement that seems hard or impossible to be achieved, we only consider the
basic assumption on PUFs that let the behaviour of PUF be unknown to anyone
even for the manufacturer [4]; and instead of existential unforgeability property
which seems impossible to be achieved for both cPUFs and qPUFs, we consider
the selective unforgeability property which is a weaker, yet more relevant, notion
than the existential one.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study on quantum security of cPUFs
in the literature. We emphasise given the speedy progress in quantum technol-
ogy the investigation of the security of cPUFs against quantum adversaries is
crucial. The security of silicon cPUFs and the other types of cPUFs that cannot
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be queried by quantum states can be explored in the post-quantum (or stan-
dard) security model where the quantum adversary has only classical interaction
with the primitive while he has been equipped with a powerful quantum com-
puter. However, for the other types of cPUF structures like optical PUFs that
can naturally be queried with quantum states, the security of cPUFs need to
be analysed in the quantum security model where the adversary in addition to
having a quantum computer can have quantum access to the cPUF oracle. Note
that quantum selective unforgeability of this type of cPUF structures can be in-
vestigated in the aforementioned model. We leave exploring these open questions
for future studies.
Quantum PUFs and Quantum Read-out of PUFs
The original definition of QR-PUFs only considered cPUFs with quantumly-
encoded challenge-response pairs such that the quantum encoding of their re-
sponses is a public knowledge [18,19]. In such a setting, everyone even the adver-
sary knows the unitary transformation or the responses. However, our definition
of qPUFs covering simple quantum devices that respond with quantum states
and their encoding can be public, private or even fully unknown to everyone
even the manufacturer, extends the concept of QR-PUFs. Thus, QR-PUFs same
as cPUFs, can be considered as a special case of UqPUFs.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal definition of security for
QR-PUFs in the literature. Instead, the security of QR-PUF-based identifica-
tion protocols has only been investigated in non-standard security models in
[18,19,20,32,33,34,36,37] where the QR-PUF responses and the classical descrip-
tion of the unitary modelling the QR-PUF, say UQR, are assumed to be public
knowledge. They showed that the security of these protocols relies only on the
negligible information that an adversary can obtain by getting the unknown
quantum state sent by the verifier.
However, our work provides security notions against general and quantum ad-
versaries in the standard game-based model and we believe they can also be ap-
plied for QR-PUFs. It can easily be shown that due to the known response states
of QR-PUFs, the adversary has more knowledge in case of QR-PUFs compared
to qPUFs, so, QR-PUFs cannot provide quantum existential unforgeability, ei-
ther. We can also show the QR-PUFs, provided that the classical description
of their UQR be known, does not even provide quantum selective unforgeability
since the challenge state does lie in the space spanned by the database of the
adversary and he can estimate the response with high fidelity using the universal
quantum emulator as has been discussed in Section 3. We should mention that
the feasibility of similar attacks with current technologies has been discussed in
[18,19,20,32,33,34,36,37]. However, it remains an interesting open question when
the quantum emulator attack presented in this paper can also be demonstrated
on emerging quantum devices. Note that, if we assume the classical description
of UQR is private if the selective challenge state can be chosen uniformly at
random from the whole Hilbert space, the QR-PUFs like qPUFs can provide
the quantum selective unforgeability. However, as stated in [18,32] QR-PUFs
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act on quantumly encoded classical information which contradicts with the as-
sumption of choosing challenges uniformly at random from the Hilbert space.
Whether QR-PUFs can provide quantum selective unforgeability or not remains
thus open. A summary of all the above observations is listed in Table 1
PUF type PUF behaviour qEUF qSUF
cPUF unknown × ?
QR-PUF
unknown × ?
known × ×
qPUF unknown × X
Table 1: Comparison between the security features of cPUFs, QR-PUFs and
qPUFs. qEUF: quantum Existential Unforgeability and qSUF: quantum Selec-
tive Unforgeability. For the cPUF, stated result on qEUF applies to classical
PUFs that can interacted with via quantum states.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Let A be a QPT adversary playing the game GUqPUFqSel (λ,A) where UqPUF
is defined over HD. Let Sin and Sout be the input and output database of the
adversary after the learning phase both with size k1, respectively. Also, Let Hd
be the d-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by elements of Sin where d ≤ k1 and
Hdout be the Hilbert space spanned by elements of Sout with the same dimension.
A receives an unknown quantum state |ψ〉 as a challenge in the qSel challenge
phase and tries to output a state |ω〉 as close as possible to |ψout〉. We are
interested in calculating the average probability that the fidelity of A’s output
state |ω〉 and |ψout〉 be larger or equal to δ. We calculate this probability over
all the possible states chosen uniformly at random from HD.
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] = Pr|ψ〉∈HD[F (|ω〉 , |ψ
out〉) ≥ δ]
We calculate this probability over all the possible states chosen uniformly at
random from HD. We will show, for any δ 6= 0, the success probability of A is
negligible in λ.
According to the game definition, as the adversary selects states of the learn-
ing phase, the classical description of these states are known for him while the
corresponding responses are unknown quantum states. Let A′ be the adversary
who also receives the classical description of the outputs, or the complete set of
bases of Hd and Hdout. So, he will have a complete description of the map in the
subspace; and as a result A′ has a greater success probability than A.
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] ≤ Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)]
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Therefore from now on throughout the proof, we calculate the success prob-
ability of A′ who has full knowledge of the subspace.
Note that the adversary cannot enhance his knowledge of the subspace by
entangling its local system to the challenges of the learning phase since the
reduced density matrix of the challenge/response entangled state lies in the
same subspace Hd and Hdout. Hereby upper-bounding the success probability of
A with the success probability of A′ who has the full knowledge of the subspace
we have also included the entangled queries. Thus without loss of generality and
to avoid complicated notations, we consider the adversary’s estimated state as
a pure state |ω〉.
Now, we partition the set of all the challenges to two parts: the challenges
that are completely orthogonal to Hd subspace, and the rest of the challenges
that have non-zero overlap with Hd. We denote the subspace of all the states
orthogonal to Hd as Hd⊥ . We calculate the success probability of A′ in terms of
the following partial probabilities:
Pr
|ψ〉∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ] and Pr
|ψ〉6∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ].
Because the probability of |ψ〉 being in any particular subset is independent of
the adversary’s learnt queries, the success probability of A′ can be written as:
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)] = Pr|ψ〉∈Hd⊥ [F ≥ δ]× Pr[|ψ〉 ∈ H
d⊥ ]
+ Pr
|ψ〉6∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ]× Pr[|ψ〉 6∈ Hd⊥ ]
where Pr[|ψ〉 ∈ Hd⊥ ] = 1 − Pr[|ψ〉 6∈ Hd⊥ ] denotes the probability of |ψ〉 that
is picked uniformly at random from HD being projected into the subspace of
Hd⊥ . From lemma 1, we know that this probability for any subspace, is equal to
the ratio of the dimensions. As Hd⊥ is a D − d dimensional subspace, Pr[|ψ〉 ∈
Hd⊥ ] = D−dD and respectively Pr[|ψ〉 6∈ Hd
⊥
] = dD . Also the probability is upper-
bounded by the cases that the adversary can always win the game for |ψ〉 6∈ Hd⊥ .
So, we have,
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)] ≤ Pr|ψ〉∈Hd⊥ [F ≥ δ]× (
D − d
D
) +
d
D
Finally, the only term that should be calculated is Pr
|ψ〉∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ].
Note that any |ψ〉 ∈ HD can be written in any set of full bases of HD as
|ψ〉 = ∑Di=1 ci |ei〉. For any |ψ〉 ∈ Hd⊥ , the set of {|ei〉}Di=1 can be the a union of
the bases of Hd, i.e. {|eini 〉}di=1 and the bases of Hd
⊥
, i.e. {|e′i〉}Di=d+1. Note that
any state in Hd⊥ is orthogonal to all the |eini 〉s. Thus, we write as follows
|ψ〉 =
d∑
i=1
cini |eini 〉+
D∑
i=d+1
c′i |e′i〉
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Recall that |ψ〉 ∈ Hd⊥ , so, 〈ψ| eini 〉 = 0 and as a result cini = 0. So,
|ψ〉 =
D∑
i=d+1
c′i |e′i〉
Similarly for the output state |ψout〉 = ∑di=1 couti |eouti 〉 + ∑Di=d+1 αi |bi〉, as
the unitary preserves the inner product, couti = 〈eouti |ψout〉 = 〈eini |U†U |ψ〉 =
〈eini |ψ〉 = 0, and the correct output state can be written as
|ψout〉 =
D∑
i=d+1
αi |bi〉
where {|bi〉}D−di=1 are a set of bases for Hd
⊥
out.
The output estimated by the adversary A′ can be written as
|ω〉 =
d∑
i=1
βi |eouti 〉+
D∑
i=d+1
γi |qi〉
where the first term represents part of the output state, that has been produced
by A from the his learnt output subspace and the second term denotes the part
lies in Hd⊥out with the set of bases {|qi〉}D−di=1 . Based on the above argument, the
fidelity of the first part is always zero as 〈bi| eouti 〉 = 0.
Note that the normalization condition implies
∑d
i=1 |βi|2+
∑D
i=d+1 |γi|2 = 1.
Thus for any state |ω〉 that has a non-zero overlap with the learnt outputs, the
fidelity with the correct state decreases. To make the A′’s strategies optimal we
assume
∑D−d
i=1 γi |qi〉 ∈ Hd
⊥
out where the normalization condition is
∑D−d
i=1 |γi|2 =
1.
Since there are infinite choices for set of bases orthogonal to {|eouti 〉}di=1, there
is no way to uniquely choose or obtain the rest of the bases to complete the set.
Also, another input of the adversary is the state |ψ〉 which according to the
game definition, is an unknown state from a uniform distribution. As a result,
the choice of the |qi〉 bases are also independent of |e′i〉 or |bi〉. Thus knowing a
matching pair of (|qi〉 , |bi〉) increases the dimension of the known subspace by
one that means the adversary has more information that it is assumed to have.
So, for each new challenge, A′ produces a state |ω〉 = ∑D−di=1 γi |qi〉 with
a totally independent choice of bases. Without loss of generality we can fix
the bases |qi〉 for different |ω〉. To calculate the success probability of A′, we
calculate the fidelity averaging over all the possible choices of ψ. As the unitary
transformation preserves the distance, it maps a uniform distribution of states
to a uniform distribution. This leads to a uniform distribution of all the possible
|ψout〉. As a result, the average probability over all possible |ψ〉 is equal to the
average probability over all possible |ψout〉.
Pr
|ψ〉∈Hd⊥
[F ≥ δ] = Pr
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
[F ≥ δ].
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Now, we show that the adversary A′ also needs to output |ω〉 according to the
uniform distribution to win the game in the average case.
Let A′ output the states according to a probability distribution D which is
not uniform. Then, by repeating the experiment asymptotically many times, the
correct response |ψout〉 covers the whole Hd⊥out while |ω〉 covers a subspace of
Hd⊥out. This decreases the average success probability of A′. So, the best strategy
for A′ is to generate the states |ω〉 such that they span the whole Hd⊥out, i.e.
generating them according to the uniform distribution.
Based on the above argument, and the fact that all the |ω〉s are produced
independently, we show that the average fidelity over all the |ψout〉 is equivalent
to average fidelity over all the |ω〉.
There are different methods for calculating the average fidelity [54], but most
commonly the average fidelity can be written as:∫
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
| 〈ω|ψoutx 〉|2dµx
where dµ is a measure based on which the reference state has been produced and
parameterized. According to our uniformity assumption, the dµ here is the Haar
measure. Note that |ω〉 can be different for any new challenge. Now we rewrite
the above average with the new parameters as:∫
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
F (|ω〉 , |ψoutx 〉)dµx =
∫
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
| 〈ω|ψoutx 〉|2dµx =
=
∫
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
|
D−d∑
i=1
γi 〈qi|ψoutx 〉|2dµx =
=
∫
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
|
D−d∑
i=1
γix 〈qi|ψout〉|2dµx =
=
∫
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
| 〈ωx|ψout〉|2dµx
=
∫
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
F (|ωx〉 , |ψout〉)dµx
The above equality holds since the fidelity is a symmetric function of two
states and the measure of integral is the same for both cases. We use this equality
for averaging all the possible outputs for one |ψout〉. Recall that we aim to
calculate the probability of the average fidelity being greater than δ. To this
end, we first calculate a more general probability that is the probability of the
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average fidelity to be non-zero. As we have
Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[F 6= 0] + Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[F = 0] = 1,
we calculate the probability of the zero fidelity for simplicity. So,
Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[F = 0] = Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[| 〈ω|ψout〉|2 = 0] =
= Pr[(
∫
|
D−d∑
i=1
γix 〈qi|ψout〉|2dµx) = 0] =
= Pr
x
[(
D−d∑
i,j=1
γixαj 〈qix | bj〉)2 = 0]
Based on the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality we have the following inequality:
[
D−d∑
i,j=1
γixαj 〈qi| bj〉]2 ≥
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi| bj〉|2
where,
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi| bj〉|2 =
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi| bj〉 〈bj | qi〉| =
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi|Πj |qi〉 |
So, we have,
Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[F = 0] ≥ Pr
x
[
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi|Πj |qi〉 | = 0]
The smaller term is the probability of |ω〉 being projected into the orthogonal
subspace of a space that only includes |ψout〉 averaging over all the projectors.
We call again Lemma 1. As the target subspace includes only one vector of the
Hilbert space, the dimension of the orthogonal subspace is always one dimension
less. Recall that d⊥ = D−d, the dimension of the intended orthogonal subspace
is equal to D − d− 1. So,
Pr
x
[(
D−d∑
i,j=1
|γixαj |2| 〈qi|Πj |qi〉 |) = 0] =
D − d− 1
D − d .
Thus,
Pr
|ω〉∈Hd⊥out
[F = 0] ≥ D − d− 1
D − d
And as a result,
Pr
|ψout〉∈Hd⊥out
[| 〈ω|ψout〉| 6= 0] ≤ 1
D − d
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So, for any non-zero δ we have,
Pr
|ψ〉∈Hd⊥
[| 〈ω|ψout〉| ≥ δ] ≤ 1
D − d
Thus, the success probability of A′ is
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A′)] =
1
D − d × (
D − d
D
) +
d
D
=
d+ 1
D
And the success probability of A is bounded by d+1D ,
Pr[1← GUqPUFqSel (λ,A)] ≤
d+ 1
D
and the theorem is proved. uunionsq
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